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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Damages-Medical Expenses of Wife-Right of Husband to Recover
from Tort-feasor
The Supreme Court of Georgia recently held' the application of a
survival statute2 authorizing the recovery of medical, hospital, and
funeral expenses by the personal representative of a person killed by
crime or negligence, unconstitutional as to defendant. Decedent was
survived by her husband who had a common law cause of action8 against
the tort-feasor for medical and funeral expenses incurred as a result
of the injury unless the wife had so acted as to make her separate estate
liable for these expenses. The court held that the statute did not
repeal the husband's cause of action. Thus both the husband, in his
own right, and the administrator, by that statute, could maintain an
action to recover the same items of damages which, if permitted, would
subject the defendant to double liability. The court held that such a
result would violate the due process clause of both the state and the
Federal Constitutions.
What then is the law in respect to the rights and liabilities of hus-
bands and wives for medical expenses4 incurred by reason of the personal
injury to the wife ?5
At the common law, a wife in her own right had very few legally en-
forceable rights and liabilities. Upon her marriage all the wife's real
property came under the control of her husband,6 and all her personal
property became, in effect, an outright gift to him;7 furthermore, she
was under a contractual disability.8 All her earnings,0 as well as any
damages recovered for injury to her person,10 accrued to the husband.
It was the husband's duty, however, to support his wife and to provide
1 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 104 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 1958).
' GA. ANN. CODE § 105-1310 (1956).3 Georgia R.R. and Banking Co. v. Tice, 124 Ga. 459, 52 S.E. 916 (1905) ; Lewis
v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756 (1886); Wrightsville & Tennille R.R. v. Vaughan, 9 Ga.
App. 371, 71 S.E. 691 (1911).
' Funeral expenses will not be considered in this Note. Partly because of varied
statutory provisions, the law governing them generally varies from the rules as
to medical expenses. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-1 (1950).
' It will be assumed in this Note that the husband and wife are living together
since, otherwise, the rights and liabilities of each spouse are governed by the type
and terms of their particular separation or divorce.
'it re Giant Portland Cement Co., 21 A.2d 697 (Del. Ch. 1941); Blood v.
Hunt, 97 Fla. 551, 121 So. 886 (1929) ; Turner v. Heinberg, 30 Ind. App. 615, 65
N.W. 294 (1902).
Woodworth v. Sweet, 51 N.Y. 8 (1865) ; Caffey v. Kelley, 45 N.C. 48 (1852).
' Jones v. Hamell, 110 Ga. 373, 35 S.E. 690 (1900); Stephens v. Hicks, 156
N.C. 239, 72 S.E. 313 (1911) ; Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 8, 27 S.E. 998 (1897).
'Mock v. Neffer, 148 Ga. 25, 95 S.E. 673 (1918); Syme v. Riddle, 88 N.C.
463 (1883) ; Kee v. Vasser, 37 N.C. 553 (1843).
"0 He must, however, take possession of them. Anderson v. Anderson, 74 Ky.
(11 Bush) 327 (1875) ; Southworth v. Packard, 7 Mass. 95 (1810).
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her with the necessities of life" which, among other things, included
medical care.'12  Therefore, the expense of any reasonable and necessary
medical services rendered to the wife was a debt of her husband, whether
he assented to the' services or not.'3 Since the liability was his, the
common law gave him a cause of action, in his own right, to recover
medical expenses proximately caused by the wrongful injury of his
wife by a third person.14 This cause of action was separate and dis-
tinct from the cause of action for personal injuries to the wife which
includes such items of damages as pain and suffering. If the wife died,
all the rights arising in her and enforceable for her expired except where
preserved by statute; however, the right to recover the expenses in-
curred prior to her death, being in the husband alone, did not expire.15
With the advance of civilization, and especially since the middle of
the nineteenth century, women have emerged from an inferior status and
gained equality with men in many respects. By statutes and by consti-
tutional provisions married women have been granted in all16 states some
or all of the following rights :7 to hold their own separate property
with little or no control by their husbands; to contract in their own right;
to retain their own earnings; and to sue and be sued alone. However,
a husband in all jurisdictions is still under the duty to support his wife
and to provide her with the necessities of life' 8 which, of course, include
medical care. The resulting rule is, therefore, that a wife may contract
for medical services and charge them against her separate estate; how-
ever, there must be an express contract to that effect by the wife, or there
must be facts and circumstances clearly showing that she intended to
bind her separate estate alone; otherwise, when medical services are
furnished the wife, the debt is upon the husband.19 If he refuses to pay
"Kenyon v. Brightwell, 120 Ga. 606, 48 S.E. 124 (1904); Lyons v. Schan-
bacher, 316 Ill. 569, 147 N.E. 440 (1925) ; Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242,
84 S.E. 265 (1915).
1 Ematurdo v. Gordon, 100 Conn. 163, 123 Atl. 14 (1923) ; Fincher v. Davis,
108 S.E. 905 (Ga. App. 1921) ; Bowen v. Daugherty, supra note 11.
" Cothran v. Lee, 24 Ala. 380 (1854).
"'Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931);
Thibeault v. Poole, 283 Mass. 480, 186 N.E. 632 (1933); Berger v. Jacobs, 21
Mich. 215 (1870); Richmond R. & Elec. Co. v. Bowles, 92 Va. 738, 24 S.E.
388 (1896) ; Wheeling v. Trowbridge, 5 W. Va. 353 (1872).
"Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867).
"MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 111 (1931).
"See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 (secures the property of married women to
them) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2 (1950) (authorizes married women to contract) ;
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1950) (authorizes married women to retain their
own earnings and damages for personal injury).
8 E.g., Bowen v. Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915). See also
numerous cases cited in 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 15, p. 404, n. 91 (1944)
and 26 Am. JuL., Husband and Wife § 337, p. 934, n.v 16 (1940).
"Public Util. Corp. v. Oliver, 64 F2d 60 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Kenyon v. Vogel,
250 Mass. 341, 145 N.E. 462 (1924); Galtney v. Wood, 149 Miss. 56, 115 So.
117 (1928); Bowen v. Daugherty, supra note 18; Hudock v. Youngstown, 164
19581
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the creditor, and she pays, she may then sue her husband and recover
the amount so paid out by showing that the goods or services were
reasonable and necessary and that she expected him to assume liability.20
Some jurisdictions allow creditors who have supplied necessities to
the wife to recover from the wife, or her estate, if the husband is found
to be insolvent.21  Others view the solvency of either party immaterial,
and a creditor must take his luck against the one on whom the liability
lies under the facts.2 2  All jurisdictions allow recovery of medical ex-
penses either by the person who is liable to the creditor for them, or by
the person who has in fact paid for them.2 A few states have statutes24
making the husband and wife jointly or severally liable to creditors for
goods and services,, including medical expenses, necessary for the sup-
port of the family. But it seems that as between the husband and wife,
the -husband is still primarily liable for necessities. 25 Since the wife
may be held liable for these necessities, she has accordingly been given
the right to recover her own medical expenses.26
In North Carolina the common law is still in effect except where
provided otherwise by statute.27  Since a husband must support his wife
and provide her with necessities, his right to recover medical expenses
caused by the wrongful injury of his wife seems to be still existent.28
Ohio St. 493, 132 N.E.2d 108 (1956); Lanzo v. Swift, 40 S.E.2d 811 (W. Va.
1946). See also, Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1189 (1930).2 Cantiello v Cantiello, 136 Conn. 685, 74 A.2d 119 (1950); Kosanke v.
Kosanke, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N.W. 1060 (1917).
"it re Chevalier, 90 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Surr. Ct. 1949) ; In re Wilson's Estate,
160 Okla. 23, 15 P.2d 825 (1932).
" Grasser v. Anderson, 273 N.W. 63 (Wis. 1937).
"' Professor McCormick states the general rule: "Under modern statutes, which
confer on the-wife the power to bind her separate estate by contract, the husband's
duty to support and care nevertheless continues, and he may still recover for the
cost already incurred for her treatment, and she may not recover for this, unless
she has actually paid for such expense or has personally contracted to do so, in
such a manner as to bind her separate estate." McCoRaicic, DAMAGES 333-34
(1935). See also VADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC REOATioZs 158-63 (1931).
Contra, Woodward v. Des Moines, 182 Iowa 1102, 165 N.W. 313 (1917) ; Floyd
v. Miller, 190 Va. 303, 57 S.E.2d 114 (1950) (4-3 decision) where wives were
allowed to recover medical expenses paid by their husbands due to wording of
statutes there involved.
" E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-10 (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7308
(1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1936); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 519.05 (1947). As a typical example, see IowA CODE ANN. § 597.14 (1950) : "The
reasonable and necessary expenses of the family and the education of the children
are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them,
and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or severally."2 it re Kosanke's Estate, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N.W. 1060 (1917).
West Chicago St. Ry. v. Carr, 170 Ill. 748, 48 N.E. 992 (1897).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1953).
No North Carolina case since the passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-2, -10,
infra notes 29 and 30, has been found squarely holding that a husband may recover
his direct expenses for the wrongful injury of the wife. However, the following
cases, indicate the court's recognition of the husband's right: Jyachosky v. Wensil,
240 N.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 644 (1954); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C.
821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
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However, the court's apparent interpretation of the controlling statutes,
G.S. §§ 52-229 and -10, 30 seems to have caused a rather liberal rule to
obtain in allowing wives to recover their medical expenses in personal
injury actions.
The first case arising after the passage of G.S. § 52-2 involving the
issue of medical expenses of the wife was Bowen v. Daugherty.5' This
was an action by the administrator of deceased wife seeking permission
to sell land in order to pay decedent's medical and funeral bills. Refusing
such permission, the court held that the statute did not remove the
husband's common law liability to support his wife and provide her
with necessities; and in absence of an express promise, or evidence
tending to show that credit was given to her, or facts or circumstances
making her exclusively or primarily liable, the debt was upon him.
There is a dictum3 2 to the effect that if the husband, in such cases, were
insolvent the court might allow a creditor to reach the wife or her estate.
In McDaniel v. Trent Mills, Inc.,3 3 the wife was suing tort-feasor for
medical expenses she allegedly incurred as a result of her husband's in-
juries. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer, and the
supreme court reversed, holding that she had stated a cause of action
for expenses incurred by her and expended out of her separate estate
made necessary by her husband's injuries.
In Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co.,3 4 the husband sued for conse-
quential damages, not including medical expenses, due to the defendant's
negligent injury of his wife. The court decided that the husband had
lost his rights for consequential damages by virtue of G.S. § 52-10, which
authorized a wife to sue for "any damages for personal injuries or other
tort sustained by her." In defining the term "damages" under that
statute, the court stated that medical expenses were, inter alia, in-
cluded therein; however, a wife's medical expenses were not at issue in
any of the cases cited35 as authority for the definition, and thus, they
" "Subject to the provisions of § 52-12, regulating contracts of wife with hus-
band affecting corpus or income of estate, every married woman is authorized to
contract and deal so as to affect her real and personal property in the same manner
and with the same effect as if she were unmarried. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-2
(1950). This act, known as the Martin Act, was passed in 1911.
"o "The earnings of a married woman by virtue of any contract for her personal
service, and damages for personal injuries, or other tort sustained by her, can be
recovered by her suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and
separate property as fully as if she had remained unmarried." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-10 (1950). This act was passed in 1913.31168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915).
32 Id. at 245, 84 S.E. at 267.
,3197 N.C. 342, 148 S.E. 440 (1929).
"224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
"Ledford v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 614, 112 S.E. 421 (1922);
Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield, 178 N.C. 348, 100 S.E. 602 (1919) ; Price v. Charlotte
Elec. Ry., 160 N.C. 450, 76 S.E. 502 (1913).
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fail to support the unqualified listing of that item as proper damages
in the wife's action. Later, in Jyachosky v. Wensil,26 the Henstetler
case was cited as authority for the statement that "ordinarily, such
[medical] expenses are proper elements of damages in a wife's tort
action. '37
If medical expenses are now a proper element of damages in the
wife's suit against tort-feasor, what has happened to the husband's
common law right to recover for these medical expenses? In the Bowen
case it was held that a husband was liable for the medical services to
his wife, absent her assumption of the debt. In McDaniel v. Trent
Mills, Inc., a wife, on whom no liability attaches by law, was allowed
to recover the medical expenses of her spouse by virtue of having paid
them. Surely, then, a husband, who is by law primarily liable for his
wife's medical expenses, may recover them from the tort-feasor absent
her sole assumption of the debt as considered in the Bowen case. But
has the court said otherwise by its definition in the Helmstetler case?
Or perhaps did the court make an over-generalization there? Taking
this definition declared by the court strictly, in North Carolina a married
woman in her personal injury action can recover her medical expenses,
unless, as intimated in Helmstetler,3 8 the husband sues and alleges
he was required to spend his own funds. If the state of the law is that
a married woman may recover by merely alleging" and proving that
medical expenses were incurred without the requirement that she allege
and prove that she either paid them out of her separate funds, or in-
curred the liability on her own credit, then one of two possibilities has
occurred: (1) defendants in such cases are subject t;i double liability,
or (2) the husband has lost his common law right to recover the medi-
cal expenses from the tort-feasor.
The first possibility was rendered unconstitutional as to the de-
fendant in the principal case because double liability was imposed by
" 240 N.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 644 (1954).
37Id. at 227, 81 S.E.2d at 651.
" "It is not alleged that the plaintiff has expended any of his own funds in
consequence of the injuries negligently inflicted upon his wife. McDaniel v.
Trent Mills, supra." 224 N.C. at 825, 32 S.E.2d at 614. If the liability to the
medical creditor is on the husband then the determination of the wife's right to
recover should not depend on whether the husband has sued.
"E.g., In the Jyachosky case the complaint read: "11. As a result of the acci-
dent the plaintiff [a married woman] has incurred medical expenses in excess of
$1,500.00, and is informed and believes that the injuries will continue to require
medical treatment and will result in the incurring of additional medical expense
as long as plaintiff lives." Transcript of Record, p. 5, Jyachosky v. Wensil, 240
N.C. 217, 81 S.E.2d 644 (1954).
It has been held that a married woman must allege the facts showing why
she, and not her husband, is entitled to the reovery of medical expenses in order
to introduce evidence on them. Wrightsville & T.R. Co. v. Vaughan, 9 Ga. App.
371, 71 S.E. 691 (1917); Brown v. Bell, 247 Mass. 437, 142 N.E. 93 (1924).
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statute.40  In Jyachosky the court said that the defendant was pro-
tected from a double recovery by the fact that the husband of the plain-
tiff testified that the money used to pay the medical bills was, in effect,
hers, thus having estopped himself from claiming otherwise should he
later attempt to sue. If the husband should refrain from any participa-
tion in his wife's action, and the defendant paid damages for which the
husband may later prove himself entitled, what is there to prevent
the husband from recovering also?
The second possibility, the abrogation of the husband's common law
right to recover the wife's medical expenses from the tort-feasor, is
manifestly unfair to husbands since the primary liability for these
medical expenses still remains on him. Consequently, the medical credi-
tor, who has not been a party4 ' to the case of "wife v. tort-feasor," can
sue the husband. Thus it would seem that the husband has a liability
without the concurrent right to indemnify himself from the wrong-doer.
Of course, no serious problem as to who gets the recovery, or who
pays the medical bill arises in the normal situation where the husband
and wife are living together harmoniously; however, the situation could
be quite different. For instance, the wife having recovered a substantial
judgment may decide this is the chance to leave husband, an uncommon
but not unheard of possibility. Or if the wife has died, an administrator
may be appointed and allowed to recover from the tort-feasor, regardless
of whether the husband has paid or is liable for the medical bills. When
it is remembered that personal injury recoveries are a general asset of
the decedent's estate2 and that medical debts are in the sixth order of
priority,4 then the husband may have a legitimate concern if the estate
,o If the Helinstetler definition is strictly followed, namely, that the right to
recover medical expenses is in the wife, then the North Carolina court may find
itself faced with the same problem that was faced by the Georgia court in the
principal case. That is, there exists in the wife a statutory cause of action for
medical expenses while at the same time the husband's common law right for
these same damages is evidently unaffected. Thus,. it is submitted that the applica-
tion of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1950), as construed in Helnstetrer, would be un-
constitutional as applied to the tort-feasor when sued for medical expenses.1 The medical creditor may, however, avail himself of a lien. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 44-49, -50 (1950), provide that a lien may be placed by a medical creditor
upon any recovery for personal injury where the person so recovering is indebted
for the medical services and supplies. G.S. § 44-49 requires that the lien be filed
in the clerk of the court's office within 30 days after the filing of the suit in order to
be valid. G.S. § 44-50 provides for cases of out of court settlement, but the writer
believes it is of doubtful value in that the statutory duty is directed at the person
receiving the settlement. Obviously, the statute was intended to assist medical
creditors to collect from the poor and from those whose practice of paying their
debts is in doubt. If the medical creditor cannot be on hand immediately after
the settlement with such persons, he is likely never to see the money. The writer
suggests that if the statutory duty were shifted to the person or corporation making
the settlement, the statute would be more effective.
" Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 332, 38 S.E.2d 105 (1946).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-105 (1950).
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is not amply solvent to cover the other debts. To be deprived of his
recourse against the tort-feasor in such cases could be a grave financial
blow to the husband. On the other hand, if the husband and the wife
both are allowed separate recoveries for the same medical expenses,
the defendant is forced to pay twice.
No North Carolina case has been found which is decisive on the
point discussed in this Note, and while trends suggesting contrary possi-
bilities have been explored, it is submitted that the North Carolina posi-
tion is that only when the injured plaintiff-wife has paid the medical
bills with her own funds, or is solely liable therefor, may she recover
them from the tort-feasor; otherwise, the husband on whom the liability
falls may recover.
JAmES S. DOCKERY, JR.
Evidence-Admissibility in Federal Prosecution Where Procured by
State Authorized Wire Tapping
In Benanti v. United States,' the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 2 and held
that evidence obtained as the result of state authorized wire tapping by
New York law enforcement officers, even though without participation
by federal officials, was inadmissible in federal courts.8
In the Supreme Court the Government attempted to justify ad-
mission of the evidence on the basis of Schwartz v. Texas4 and by draw-
ing an analogy to fourth amendment cases in which evidence illegally
procured by state officers acting in their own behalf and without federal
participation was admissible in federal prosecutions.5
In the Schwartz case the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained
by wire tapping by state officials was admissible in state courts. The
Court in the Benanti case distinguished the Schwartz case on the ground
that in the latter "due regard to federal-state relations precluded the
conclusion that Congress intended to thwart a state rule of evidence in
the absence of a clear indication to that effect." In the Benanti case
'355 U.S. 96 (1957).
'Benanti v. United States, 244 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1957).
'The wire tapping was by state officials who had obtained a warrant in accord-
ance with state law authorizing the wire tapping. The petitioner was suspected
of violating the New York narcotics laws. When the state officers made their
arrest, they found the petitioner was not transporting narcotics in violation of
state law, but was transporting nontaxed alcohol in violation of federal law. Evi-
dence of this violation was turned over to federal authorities who began this
prosecution. Although the New York police were acting pursuant to state law,
N.Y. CoxsT. art. 1, § 12; N.Y. CoDz CRim. PROC. § 813-a (1942), both the court
of appeals and the Supreme Court found they violated section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952).
'344 U.S. 199 (1952). 5355 U.S. at 101.
a Ibid.
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